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Presiden Joko Widodo masih memiliki fokus yang sama – bahkan lebih intens – dalam periode 
kedua kepresidenannya terkait dengan pembangunan ekonomi. Jokowinomics, yang menjadi jargon 
model pembangunan ala Presiden Joko Widodo seringkali dipamerkan sebagai prestasi nasional untuk 
memenangkan hati konstituen melalui gedung pencakar langit, jembatan penghubung dan transportasi 
umum modern. Pendekatan teknokratik dan pragmatis ini disebut oleh dunia akademisi sebagai bentuk 
‘new developmentalism’. Tulisan ini akan membuktikan bahwa agenda pembangunan materialistis 
dengan Jokowinomics terlalu sempit untuk menjawab tantangan pemenuhan hak-hak sipil warga negara 
Indonesia, sebagaimana yang tertuang dalam cakupan agenda no.16 Sustainable Development Goals 
yang dicanangkan oleh United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Ledakan pembangunan 
infrastruktur di era kepresidenan Joko Widodo dibarengi dengan dikeluarkannya Undang-Undang yang 
represif terhadap minoritas tertentu, pelemahan beberapa institusi penopang keadilan, hingga 
pembatasan kebebasan pers kemudian menjadi kontradiksi dalam pembangunan yang seharusnya 
menyejahterakan dan memerdekakan masyarakat sipil. Dengan menggunakan konsep ‘development as 
freedom’ oleh Amartya Sen, tulisan ini menawarkan untuk mengevaluasi implikasi dari implementasi 
Jokowinomics terhadap pemenuhan hak sipil untuk mencapai pembangunan yang bersifat inklusif dan 
berkelanjutan. Tulisan ini kemudian akan esensial sebagai studi kasus pembangunan negara 
berkembang yang saat ini masih didominasi oleh narasi neoliberal pragmatis yang pada akhirnya kurang 
mengindahkan usaha pemenuhan hak-hak sipil.  
 
Kata Kunci: Jokowinomics, Sustainable Development Goals no.16, Just Development, Hak Sipil.  
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Introduction  
The 16th agenda of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) covers mostly on the importance 
of human basic and civil rights that is later specified into the perspective of individual rights and a wider 
approach in the form of an institutional basis. On the individual level, the 16th agenda stresses upon the 
need to ensure the rights to live, to be free from whatever form of torture, the rights to obtain information, 
access to political participation, and the rights to legal personality and justice.1 While institutionally, 
the 16th agenda points out the need to build an effective institution, mostly referring to state and its 
subordinates, that are inclusive and accountable which particularly relates to democratic, non-
discriminatory and anti-corruption government.2 Indonesia has already committed to achieve SDGs by 
the end of 2030 through a Presidential Decree that enacts as the legal basis to incorporate the goals into 
the national vision and by the establishment of a National Coordination Team placed under the direct 
coordination of the President.3 That being said, the development plan is supposed to implement the 
indicators needed to realize the world envisioned by the global framework to be translated into a peace-
and-justice-oriented development plan.  
‘Infrastructure’ and ‘fast growth’ seem to be the most familiar buzzwords when President Joko 
Widodo (or more popularly known as “Jokowi”) laid out his plan for national development. In his first 
presidential campaign before securing his seat in 2014, Jokowi had shown ambitions in reviving the 
economic growth, promising a 7% growth by the end of 2019.4  Although he failed to deliver and only 
reached 5.2% of growth by the end of his first term, Jokowi had always seemed to defend his 
infrastructure boom as the top priority for building Indonesia, which is evident when Prabowo, a long-
time political rival criticized him in the 2019 presidential debate about how little and disproportionate 
Indonesia’s defense budget is in comparison to other neighboring countries including Singapore.5 In 
response to such criticisms, Jokowi tended to give a nuanced answer on acknowledging other needs, 
but infrastructure has to be one of the top concern and main budget allocation. His achievement in 
building highways, bridges, electricity and water infrastructures was also rarely absent in his re-election 
bid campaign in winning the hearts of the national constituents. So, when he secured his second term 
after a tight competition with Prabowo, it was no longer surprising when Jokowi became even more 
explicit with his economic ambitions by aiming to cut bureaucratic red tapes, inviting as many foreign 
                                                          
1 Komnas HAM, “Tujuan 16,” in Kerangka Analisis untuk Mengintegrasikan Tujuan Pembangunan 
Berkelanjutan (SDGs) dengan Kewajiban Pemenuhan Hak-hak Asasi Manusia untuk di Indonesia, available in 
komnasham.go.id 
2 “Progress of Goal 16 in 2019,” SDG Knowledge Platform, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16 
3 “Indonesia’s Commitment to Sustainable Development: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” 
Kementrian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, https://indonesia4unsc.kemlu.go.id/index.php/our-
priorities/indonesia-s-commitment-to-sustainable-development 
4 Timothy Cheston, “Indonesia and the Quest for 7% Growth: Overpromise or Underperformance?” Atlas of 
Economic Complexity Harvard, https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/stories/indonesia/ 
5 Jokowi nuanced response in verbatim: “We all agree we need to increase our defence budget. But we must 
have priorities. For now, it is infrastructure”. Read more on Peter McCawley, 2019, “Jokowi bets on an 
infrastructure boom,” East Asia Forum, April 10,  https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/04/10/jokowi-bets-on-
an-infrastructure-boom/ 
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investments as possible, opening doors to capital and jobs; all to create an independent Indonesia so it 
can become one of the top 5 world economy.6 He also straightforwardly promised the people, in his 
second inaugural speech, to obstruct anything that stands in the way of the infrastructure development 
and people’s jobs.7 Such firm stance on economy and his leadership overall is a sufficient telling that 
infrastructure and fast economic growth will play a central part on how he is going to spend the rest of 
his five years incumbency. This signature approach then was branded as Jokowinomics as its identifier. 
Seeing that the trajectory for Jokowinomics in the second term will most likely follow the path of the 
first one, it is urgent to assess on whether the approach is strategic enough for Indonesian development’s 
sustainability.  
Notably, this style and orientation has been previously analyzed by scholars, including Eve 
Warburton who called Jokowinomics as a new form of developmentalism. Her definition of ‘new 
developmentalism’ derives from differentiating between the ideal developmentalist ideas and the 
repressive development model. The ideal developmentalist ideas refers to the development approach in 
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in post-World War II era with fast-paced industrialization and 
significant portion of state intervention. On the other hand, there existed a repressive development 
model back in ‘New Order’ regime under President Soeharto’s dictatorship.8  She argued the ‘new 
developmentalism’ is neither of those models. Instead, the developmentalism that emerges in Jokowi’s 
era is best described as pursuing fast development to overcome backwardness and catch up with 
advanced countries, subordinating other political goals to the overarching aim of achieving rapid 
economic growth.9 It is said to also be conservative, by the aversion of politically sensitive problems 
such as law reform, corruption and good governance that could jeopardize the stable climate which 
eventually may hinder growth. Commitment to these development agendas result into narrow, 
pragmatic economic policy goals.10 Warburton’s literature had deeper focused on answering the why’s 
of the topic by analyzing Jokowi’s political maneuver in achieving the political stability and majority 
voice he didn’t have during the early days of his cabinet.  
A similar argument was also presented by Fredick Broven Kayanta in discussing about the 
discourse factors in Jokowi’s infrastructure development plan. Kayanta argued that Jokowi’s first-term 
presidency saw an overly-hegemonic discourse on infrastructure development that triggered 
antagonism from civil society and intellectual groups by disregarding any clear resolution towards 
human rights issues.11 Paul J. Burke also challenged the material-oriented development in one of his 
                                                          
6 Ibid.  
7 Ian Morse, 2019, “Indonesia aims for the fastest growth in Jokowi’s term,” The Diplomat, August 28, 
https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/indonesia-aims-for-fastest-growth-of-jokowis-term/ 
8 Eve Warburton, 2016, “Jokowi and the New Developmentalism,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
52:3, p.307, DOI: 10.1080/00074918.2016.1249262.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Frederick Bowen Ekayanta, 2019,”Ideology and Pragmatism: Discourse Factors in Infrastructure 
Development in Indonesia’s Jokowi-JK Era,” Jurnal Politik Vol.4, No.2, DOI: 10.754/jp.v4i2.229.  
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literatures, stating that the current development plan should focus more on the inclusivity and the 
protection of marginalized societies.12  
The existing literatures have acknowledged that Jokowi’s developmental agendas have been 
dominated by pragmatic and materialistic agendas on economic growth and discounts other agendas 
that are supposed to be as urgent in the society in the process. This paper will try to fill the gap by being 
more specific, by assessing the existing development plan in Jokowi’s first term with its impacts and 
implications towards the progress of Indonesian civil rights protection as one of Indonesia’s 
commitment in attaining SDGs. On another important note, as this paper will argue that the current 
development strategy is not enough for liberating Indonesian society holistically, it will not try to nullify 
the benefits of infrastructure boom and economic growth. Instead, this paper will argue on the needs to 
have a better account on human rights liberalization in Jokowi’s development agendas. Although it 
might be challenging to conclude that there is a direct causal relationship between infrastructure 
development and protection of civil rights, it is important to realize that repercussion of policy 
implementations are multidimensional in nature. This leads to the need of an assessment towards the 
fields affected, which will remained untouched if we keep using the same traditional lenses of growth. 
Furthermore, this paper aims to show that there needs to be a wider focus when we approach 
developmental ideas for Indonesia. To depict this argument clearly, this paper will use a qualitative 
method to gather data from sources such as political speeches, mass media and related literatures. Other 
than that, this paper will lay the groundwork on the thinking of Amartya Sen in Development as 
Freedom that will be elaborated below.  
 
Development as Freedom  
Amartya Sen defines freedom as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. 
Conventional and traditional approach to development that is either by identifying progress of 
development through the growth of gross national product, the rise of personal incomes, 
industrialization, or technological advance, is simply too narrow and insufficient.13 As much as all of 
those can serve as very important indicator, it should be treated simply as means to expand the freedoms 
enjoyed by society.14 This is due to the fact that we despise poverty not due to the lack of income per 
se, but on how the lack of income denies us from accessing means of other things that can grant us our 
freedom; be it politically, economically or socially. Therefore, human freedoms should become the 
central detrimental factors of developmental strategy where it is not only the primary ends of 
development, but should also become the principal means of it. Sen sees that the conventional approach 
relies heavily on the perspective of utilitarianism that attaches no intrinsic importance to claims of rights 
                                                          
12 Paul J. Burke and Martin D. Sirayanamual, 2019, “No one left behind in Indonesia?” Bulletin of Economic 
Studies, 55:3, 269-293, DOI: 10.1080/00074918.2019.1690410.  
13 Amartya Sen, 2000, Development as Freedom, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.  p. 3 
14 Ibid. 
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and freedoms. Instead, these claims of rights and freedoms are valued indirectly and only to the extent 
of their influence utilities.15 Although taking notes of happiness is sensible, being a happy slave is of 
course not an ideal or desired condition. Such approach on utilitarianism, according to Sen, has caused  
people all around the world still suffer from varieties of ‘unfreedom’ despite the dominating optimistic 
discourse on market and economic growth. These unfreedoms include famines, inaccessibility of 
healthcare and education, to gender inequality that greatly plunders women from their capabilities to 
obtain substantive freedom. 
Specifically, Sen identifies five types of freedoms; political freedom, economic facilities, social 
opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security. 16  These key points are called 
‘instrumental freedoms’ as they tend to contribute to the general capability of a person to live more 
freely, and are interconnected and complementary to each other where they may greatly help one in 
advancing freedom of other types.17 Political freedoms relate to those called civil rights, which is the 
main focus of this paper. It is broadly conceived as the opportunity to determine who should govern 
and on what principles, to include the opportunity to scrutinize and criticize authorities, to have freedom 
of political expression and an uncensored press, and so on.18 As they are interrelated and influential to 
the existence of each other, political freedom is one of the most basic entitlement that enacts as a voice 
to guarantee the access to other forms of freedom, hence the importance.  
Systematical deprivation of political liberty and basic civil rights deny the people from many 
other forms of security, including prevention of famines or other economic disasters in which a working 
democracy should provide.19 However, Sen noted an important clarification that political liberty and 
basic civil rights should be directly essential on their own, and do not have to be justified in terms of 
their practical outcome on economy. Political and civil rights are important as they give people 
sovereignty to lead their lives and take part in the public affairs that affect them at the end of the day. 
Since these freedoms are constitutive elements of human freedom, their denial is a handicap itself. 
Meaning, their plunder in exchange for rapid economic growth, or any alleged advantages in promoting 
economic development would never be acceptable, and any approach that wants to justify any means 
for the ends while sacrificing people’s sovereignty in form of their political liberty and civil rights in 
the process is simply a false claim in default. This premise on the importance of political liberty and 
civil rights is crucial for readers to grasp before we dive into the arguments that will be presented below, 
as we will finally see how the development strategy of Indonesia can’t simply put away or discount any 
civil liberty of Indonesian people for the sake of graphs and numbers of growth.  
In order to identify on whether the instruments of freedom are available, Sen uses two facets of 
measures: processes that allow freedom of actions and decisions, and the actual opportunities that 
                                                          
15 Ibid, p.62.  
16 Ibid, p.36-38.  
17 Ibid, p.37.  
18 Ibid, p.39.  
19 Ibid, p.16.  
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people have as the result of their personal and social circumstances.20 To create distinction between 
these two, Sen noted on the importance of seeing freedom in a broad way, where we take concerns 
about the appropriate procedures; the nature of the processes that bring the opportunities to the 
freedom of choice people have, and the adequate opportunities that people should have substantively 
earned as humans, in order to see what kind of capability deprivation that occurs at the consequence of 
the process.21 More specifically in his more established work on the operationalization of the theory, in 
Rationality and Freedom, Amartya Sen proposed to analyze the preference of individuals and societies 
(both can be independent from each other, yet they sometimes mirror one another) and compare it with 
the reality of capabilities people enjoy to obtain those preferences.22 These facets will be later used as 
the tool to operate the analysis presented below, as this paper’s take on the process will be centered 
around the policies and the violation of procedures that finally take away the actual opportunities people 
are supposed to have at hand.  
In regards to the current system dominated by the market, although he provided criticisms for 
the system, Sen does not reject all the standard economic argument in favor of the market mechanism. 
23  He argued that the freedom to access the free market is one of the important contribution for 
development, acknowledging the access to labor and capital indeed exist at the heart of the free market. 
However, there needs to be an active scrutinizing from the public towards the market to ensure it can 
run as competitive as it is accessible for the people. He argued that to enable society in enjoying the 
benefits of development, there is a need to develop and support the plurality of institutions that include 
democratic and legal system, market structure, educational and health provisions, media access and so 
on.24 The institution can incorporate private initiatives and public arrangements to make it happen.25 In 
other words, Sen does not stand on a rigid structure of the operations of development and realized the 
multidimensional nature of our current system as well as the potential of each actors involved in 
pursuing the ideal development.  
Conclusively, the set of ideas Amartya Sen presented in Development as Freedom calls for 
human development to be placed at the center of the stage. It should be treated both as means where 
instrumental freedom is essential to provide greater extent of freedom, yet at the end this human 
development will make a direct contribution to the expansion of human capabilities and the quality of 
life. Increase in quality and equity of healthcare, education, social security, etc. directly affect the 
quality of life and its flourishing.26 In macro level, a country that can guarantee these instruments before 
all material inducing development plan (infrastructure boom, for instance) can actually achieve 
                                                          
20 Ibid, p.17.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Amartya Sen, 2002, Rationality and Freedom, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 620-654.  
23 Bertil Tungodden, 2001, Balanced view of Development as Freedom, CMI Working Papers (WP) 2001:14, 
p.14.  
24 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, p. 53. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid, p.144.  
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remarkable results in terms of the length and quality of life of the entire population. Finally, it opens up 
chances to impact the productivity of people, and economic growth on a widely shared basis. Thus, the 
idea presented by Amartya Sen is not in a world of binary, where we have to choose between human 
freedom and economic growth. Instead, he argued that when we prioritize human development and the 
expansion of their freedom is when we can achieve the most of the development, in terms of its quality 
and its sustainability. Understanding this concept by Amartya Sen will be useful in assessing the current 
existing Indonesian developmental plan as well as its future trajectory, on whether it has fulfilled the 
main potential of human freedom, specifically their civil rights, to result in a sustainable growth instead 
of mere optimistic numbers on quarterly reports.  
 
Jokowinomics and Its Ambitious Plan 
 In August 2016, Jokowi delivered a state-of-the-nation address and proclaimed acceleration of 
national development. The speech was heavily nuanced on domestic issues, particularly on 
infrastructure, with very limited spotlight on foreign policy, democracy and justice system.27 He laid 
out his ambitions to deliver 35,000 watts of electricity, develop five port hubs and 19 feeder ports, build 
3,650 kilometers of new roads and achieve 100% access to clean water nationwide.28 To realize this, he 
provided bigger funding in infrastructure sector. In comparison to his predecessors which was only 
budgeted for 9.48% in SBY’s presidency, Jokowi’s term reached 14.46% of the state budget. Other than 
that, the famous un-populist policy of decreasing the fuel subsidy from Rp 276 trillion to Rp 64.67 
trillion was done to provide a capital injection to state-owned enterprises, and infrastructure 
development.29 By 2018, the administration managed to build 3,432 km of national roads, 947 km of 
toll roads, 39.8 km of bridges, 134 suspension bridges, 754.59 km of railway lines, 10 airports, 19 ports 
and 17 dams.30  Although still far from the initial goal, there had been promising progress of the 
infrastructure development.   
Assuming the second term, Jokowi also maintained the same spirit but with additional focus on 
human capital development, acknowledging the lags and unpreparedness in facing the international 
competition. To this, approximately Rp 506 trillion from the state budget is allocated for education 
funds. Furthermore, his ambition for the second term included the simplification of bureaucracy, where 
he promised easier entry point for business in Indonesian market. This is realized through the much-
debated Omnibus Law that was marketed for employment creation and investment invitation that have 
been rejected by Labor Unions.  
                                                          
27 Eve Warburton, “Jokowi and the New Developmentalism,” 
28 Ibid.  
29 Frederick Bowen Ekayanta, Ideology and Pragmatism, p.306-307. 
30 Wilmar Salim and Siwage Dharma Negara, 2018, “Infrastructure Development under the Jokowi 
Administrations: Progress, challenges and policies,” Journal of Southeast Asian Economies Vol. 35 Issue 3,  
p.255 
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 The rationales of Jokowi’s ambitions behind these mega projects of infrastructure was 
acceptable. The government saw that infrastructure is the basic capital to move forward and the 
development must be done soon to avoid bigger loss in the future. Indonesia had lagged of infrastructure 
as results of the previous administrations deficiencies in the system and had caused Indonesia in 
uncompetitive advantage when compared to the developed countries.31 As the administration marketed 
the infrastructure boom as pro-poor policies, we have seen progress in the reduction of people living 
under the national poverty line, which counts for 9.4% per February 2020 in comparison to the double-
digit rate of 11.25% at the start of the first-term presidency.32 Acknowledging this achievement is 
essential to show where this paper stands, where we are not arguing against the concept of infrastructure 
development per se, but more in the way the administration frames it as the only important thing to see 
and shutting off the spotlight from other if not more, equally pressing issues.  Hence, it’s crucial to 
analyze the implications of this narrow focus towards the agenda of civil rights liberty for Indonesian 
people which will be discussed in the next part.  
 
The Stagnation in the Fight for Civil Rights Liberty in Indonesia  
 Referring to Amartya Sen’s ideas of development, human freedom should be put at the central 
part of the plan. This part will assess Indonesian developmental plan during Jokowi’s first term and his 
ongoing second term (after having established they are on similar trajectories in the previous part) on 
whether the policies and plans can grant better civil rights protection for Indonesian people. The analysis 
will be divided into the process and the actual opportunity as the method to assess the availability of 
civil rights protection for Indonesian people.  
Analyzing the process, as referred to Amartya Sen’s operationalization method, requires 
scrutiny on the policies on the macro level to discover systematic violation of procedures that will 
eventually affect the opportunities of people on the ground. Relating to this, Jokowi’s presidency in the 
first term can serve a legitimate claim of a pattern of democratic decay, which arguably one of the most 
detrimental factors to indicate a civil rights liberty. Quantifiably, Indonesia democracy index has 
experienced the second lowest score of the decade in 2019, scoring only by 6.4 and placed 64th position 
out of 167 countries, in comparison to the starting point of 6.9 in 2014.33 The index was published by 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) that is based on five indicators; electoral process, pluralism, 
government functions, political participation, political culture and civil liberties. 34  Other than 
quantification, this part will go to a further extent to analyze the policies formed during Jokowi’s 
                                                          
31 Ibid.  
32 Redi Sunarta, 2019, “Indonesia’s Poverty Profile” Towards Data Science, Aug 15, 
https://towardsdatascience.com/indonesias-poverty-profile-6f53b14def0f 
33 Karina M. Tehusijarana, 2020, “Indonesia, once regional model, falls further behind Malaysia in democracy 
rankings,” The Jakarta Post, January, 22, https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2020/01/22/2019-eiu-
democracy-index-shows-indonesia-falling-further-behind-malaysia.html 
34 Ibid.  
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presidency to prove that democratic decay happens in a qualitative manner. Analyzing the democratic 
nature is necessary as the ‘process’ from Amartya Sen’s idea, which is to acknowledge that  democracy 
is an important enabler (or disabler, if lack thereof) for people to have a voice and fight for their civil 
rights. 
First, we take a look on the structure of his presidency that will affect the whole decision-
making process. It is notable that Jokowi’s win in 2014 was thought to be a breath of fresh air to 
Indonesian oligarchic politics. Being a political outsider, Jokowi’s rise from being a mayor of the City 
of Solo, then later the governor of the capital, had framed him as a challenge to the oligarchic rule. His 
down-to-earth leadership was widely celebrated where we could see massive grass-root voluntarism 
emerged to show support for his candidacy. However, a year into his winning, the celebration turned 
into disappointment, as we saw Jokowi’s transactional politics and clientelist pattern when he tried and 
succeeded in building a big-tent party coalition for his cabinet,35 trying to secure as much support as 
possible for the sake of political stability. The consolidation of the political power resulted in significant 
decrease of opposition minority, from just 37% seats in parliament to 69% majority in 2016.36 Showing 
an arguably little significance in reforming the political dynasty, long gone was the image of a clean 
and reformist president. Instead, Jokowi was closer to the image of politics of accommodation and 
vested interests of the same old figures.37 Understanding this context is important to contextualize the 
structural formation of the government and how it affects the quality of democracy, where his hard-won 
political equilibrium may finally grant him a ‘conducive’ political climate for his infrastructure 
ambitions, and in exchange, the mechanism of check-and-balance which is essential in democracy 
might be harmed in the longer term.  
The political climate in Jokowi’s presidency has also witnessed a momentous growth of 
divisiveness and the rise of identity politics, evidently since the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial election that 
imprisoned Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (or familiarly known as Ahok) with alleged religious blasphemy, 
which effect lasted until the latest presidential election in 2019.38 The antagonism and the phenomenon 
of Islamic populism has been observed to be on the rise, hence decreasing the degree of tolerance 
towards the plural nature of Indonesian society which may play as one of the factors in the weakening 
of our democracy index.39 This characterization is visible through the courses of events leading up both 
to the election in 2017 and 2019 where mega mass movement such as 411 and 212 occurred with their 
divisive messages between those of conservatives and pluralists. The religious polarization with heavy 
                                                          
35 Yuki Fukuoka and Luky Djani, 2016, “Revisiting the rise of Jokowi: The triumph of reformasi or an 
oligarchic adaptation of post-clientelist initiatives” Southeast Asia Research Vol 24(2): 204-221 
36 Eve Warburton, p.298-299.  
37 Jokowi has been surrounded with strong figures from the Suharto era, such as Wiranto and Luhut Panjaitan 
who are positioned in strategic functions in his cabinet for two terms in a row.  
38 Read more on Charlotte Setijadi, “Ahok’s Downfall and the Rise of Islamist Populism in Indonesia,” ISEAS 
Perspective Issue 2017, No.38, June 2017.   
39 Read more on “Anti-Ahok to Anti-Jokowi: Islamist Influence on Indonesia’s 2019 Election Campaign,” 
IPAC Report No. 55, March 15, 2019. 
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sectarian messages that color most of the political process in Indonesia has created a new challenge for 
pluralist candidates in winning their electorates.40 This is one of the process aspects that is referred by 
Sen which poses as one of the institutional challenges that hinders the substantive rights of pluralism 
for Indonesian people.  
Going deeper into the policies, Jokowi’s presidency has produced notable bills that affect the 
institutional capability of the government in pursuing a transparent and accountable government which 
inevitably has consequences over the procedure of civil rights protection. One of the most disputed bill 
that triggered one of the biggest mass protests in 2019 was the revision of the bill for Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) or Commission for Corruption Eradication.41 The bill was believed to 
weaken the independence and authority KPK previously had to fight against the corrupted elites as it 
was going to be under the supervision of a governmental body. Media and scholar critics called the 
revision as a disastrous assault towards the democracy for its secretive nature in the process of drafting 
and passing the bills, and how it ignored society’s response and aspiration by ratifying the bill 
eventually.42 Along with the KPK bill, revision for a new criminal code (RKUHP) was also widely 
rejected amongst the protesters as the new bill will criminalize actions that are considered as breach of 
privacy, including extramarital sex, abortion to insulting the president.43 Furthermore, there are many 
alleged cases of police excessive violence towards the protesters at that time that receive no clear 
solvency as of time of writing in March 2020.44 These two major regulations indicate a growing trend 
of shutting down public opinion, as government limited the platform of expression for the people 
through police force or by simply establishing such system that actually overlooks public opinion. This 
became a violation of procedure that limited the substantive rights of people to determine the trajectory 
of government as supposedly given by the democratic principles the country held on to. As results, the 
opportunity aspect of people to enjoy the freedom, one of them being freedom of expression is deprived 
and disabled by the existing process.  
Another case study relating to the argument is the ongoing debate on Omnibus Law. The law 
covers the employment issue that is marketed by the government to ease business and to incentivize 
                                                          
40 Thomas P. Power, 2018, Jokowi’s authoritarian turn and Indonesia’s democratic decline, Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, 54:3, 307-338, DOI: 10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918 
41 Komisi Pemberantas Korupsi (KPK) is a used-to-be independent institution to fight corruption within 
governmental bodies and actors, popular for its Operasi Tangkap Tangan, roughly translated to immediate arrest 
that caught the corruptors off guard to be proceeded to law enforcement. 
42 Editorial Board, 2019, “Legislative assault on KPK,” The Jakarta Post, September 18, 
https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/09/18/legislative-assault-on-kpk.html 
43 Kate Lamb, 2019, “Thousands protest against the new criminal code across Indonesia,” The Guardian,  
September 24, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/24/thousands-protest-against-new-criminal-code-
across-indonesia 
44 Read more on Kharishar Kahfi, 2020, “2019 saw rise of new resistance after Indonesia failed to protect rights: 
Amnesty,” The Jakarta Post, January 30, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/01/30/2019-saw-rise-of-
new-resistance-after-indonesia-failed-to-protect-rights-amnesty.html 
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foreign capital to invest in the country.45 The law is often summed up to “flexible working hours, easy 
firing and easy hiring” that is set to apply during Jokowi’s second term.46 The draft invited rejection 
and constant mass demonstrations from the civil society, in particular the labor unions that interpret the 
new regulation will threaten job security of Indonesian workers and loose regulations the foreign 
employment which is not ideal for Indonesia’s booming productive population. Again, this regulation 
has the similar nuance on creating a pro-business law that is pragmatic to boost up growth and capital 
for the country development but harmful to those in the grass root level.  
Minority and specific marginalized group have also experienced inadequacy of protection for 
their civil rights liberty. Crackdown on Papua that includes internet shutdown which sparked a national 
controversy, can be a representative case study. The separatist movement in West Papua is not a new 
phenomenon where it includes complex history that traces back to Indonesia’s post-independence era 
in 1945. However, when Jokowi came to power in 2014, he promised a new approach to resolve the 
ever-present grievances of Papuans. To achieve this, he built inroads and infrastructure to promote 
connectivity and accessibility for Papua, with Trans-Papua as one of his flagship project. In the report 
of his 4-years progress of his first term that was published by Badan Kependudukan dan Keluarga 
Berencana Nasional (BKKBN) also highlighted on the success of infrastructure development in Papua 
and the economic productivity that increased as the result.47 However, alongside to the infrastructure 
development, there were 69 extrajudicial killings occurred in Papua with 10 foreign journalists arrest 
in the period of Jokowi’s supposedly new resolve methods.48 Notably, 24 construction workers in the 
eastern part of Papua have also been killed by unknown gunmen after embarking on separatist 
movement related celebrations in December 2018. The development and resolution of this case remain 
undiscovered as independent media have suffered from strict limitations of access to the news of the 
region.49 Furthermore, September 2019 saw a new conflict escalation with a nation-wide protest after 
alleged attack and racial sentiments that are directed towards the Papuans. Jokowi’s response to the 
conflict was particularly problematic towards the aspect of political freedom of the people, where 
internet shutdown and police violence methods were used to silence the Papuan grievances. This 
particular case study has shown that there is a significant defect in the process aspect, where Jokowi 
took a narrow approach of building infrastructures while leaving the human rights violation issues to 
continue. Furthermore, the pattern of governmental response to conflicts happening in Papua have 
shown a structural hindrance towards the protection of Papuans. This process aspects result in a 
                                                          
45 Jefferson Ng, 2020, “Jokowi’s Macron Moment: Moving together or moving fast?” New Mandala, January 
29,  https://www.newmandala.org/jokowis-macron-moment/ 
46 Ibid.  
47 BKKBN, 2018, “Laporan 4 Tahun Pemerintahan Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla,” available on 
https://www.bkkbn.go.id/po-content/uploads/Laporan-4-Tahun-Jokowi-JK.pdf 
48 Friski Riana, 2018, “KontraS: Human Rights Issues Not Priority for Jokowi-JK,” Tempo, October 20, 
https://en.tempo.co/read/922704/kontras-human-right-issues-not-priority-for-jokowi-jk 
49 2018, Indonesia attack: Gunmen kill 24 construction workers in Papua,” BBC, December 20, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46446719 
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deprivation in the freedom of expression, especially with structural violence and the internet shutdown 
policy. Media restriction also has limited the freedom of access to information for Papuans, which is 
one of the most fundamental civil rights to bear.  
Although development and civil rights are not supposed to be exclusionary from one another, 
Jokowi administration is seemingly treating them otherwise by prioritizing the former and discounting 
the latter. The pattern of regulation making in Jokowi’s era has been proven to pose a structural 
challenge in regards to ensuring a conducive procedure in granting substantial political freedom or civil 
rights for Indonesians. This challenge then affected the capability deprivation for Indonesians in terms 
of enjoying their civil rights, where we see attempts on limiting or ignoring voices from grass-root level 
hence depriving them of their freedom to express and to be involved in the policy making. We also see 
the rise of identity politics that deprive people of their capability to access plural political climate which 
is important given Indonesian plural background. More explicit of capability deprivation visible in cases 
of minority persecution in the case of Papua, where their freedom of expression, self-determination and 
access to information are structurally made unavailable due to the deficiencies of process.   
 
Conclusion  
 The way for Jokowi to approach development for Indonesia is indeed distinct. It prioritizes 
capital injection, skyscrapers, highways, etc. to achieve promising numbers of growth and productivity, 
which at first glance was prospective and optimistic. However, the dominating discourse on this 
approach, and this approach only, poses a trade-off for the civil rights liberty of Indonesians, where 
sensitive and challenging issues of human rights protection is set aside for the sake of a stable economic 
climate that is appealing to investors. This narrative of development then, is the traditional perspective 
of development that Amartya Sen concerned about in his thinking of Development as Freedom, where 
material and pragmatic goals of growth is treated as an end of itself, instead of means to achieve a 
greater freedom for the people. As the process and opportunity aspect of Indonesian political freedom 
have been proven as deficient after analyzing major case studies of human rights violation in Jokowi’s 
term, it can be concluded that the narrow and pragmatic agenda is not enough for reaching a sustainable 
benefit of development.  There is an urgency for Jokowi’s administration to reevaluate on the current 
approach of development where shining portfolio investments is currently treated as the achievement 
the administration can brag upon. Instead, it needs to take on the human-centered perspective as 
proposed by Amartya Sen, where liberation of human rights and granted freedoms for persecuted 
minorities should have been the worthy celebration of the administration. As Jokowi is living his second 
and last term, it is still not too late to create a legacy that can achieve a human development as the key 
to a sustainable and inclusive growth for Indonesia.  
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